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What Constitutes an Invalid "Blanket
Consent" Within the Purview of Illinois'
Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Confidentiality Act?'
INTRODUCTION

magine a situation where a recipient2 of mental health services
authorizes her therapist 3 to release her mental health records for
purposes of custody litigation. Unbeknownst to the recipient,
within these records is her therapist's personal notes suggesting that she
may suffer from schizophrenia. Certainly such a suggestion is potentially
fatal in the context of a custody dispute. 4 An issue ripe for litigation
concerns whether the aforementioned authorization constitutes an invalid
"blanket consent" within the purview of Illinois' Mental Health and
5
Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act ("Confidentiality Act").
Section 3 of the Confidentiality Act provides that all mental health6
and developmental disabilities treatment records and communications
shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except under explicitly

1. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 (2000) [hereinafter Confidentiality Act]. •
A "recipient" is defined under the Confidentiality Act as "a person who is
2.
receiving or has received mental health or developmental disabilities services." 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2000).
3. A "therapist" is defined under the Confidentiality Act as "a psychiatrist,
physician, psychologist, social worker, or nurse providing mental health or developmental
disabilities services or any other person not prohibited by law from providing such services
or from holding himself out as a therapist if the recipient reasonably believes that such
person is permitted to do so." Id.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Scott, 394 N.E.2d 779, 782 (11. App. Ct. 1979)
4.
(upholding the trial court's decision to modify custody on the ground that the mother
exhibited a history of paranoid schizophrenia).
5. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 (2000).
"Confidential communication" or "communication" is defined under the
6.
Confidentiality Act as "any communication made by a recipient or other person to a
therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing
mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient ... includ[ing] information
which indicates that a person is a recipient." 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/2 (2000). "Record"
is defined under the Confidentiality Act as "any record kept by a therapist or by an agency
in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient
concerning the recipient and the services provided." Id.
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enumerated circumstances. 7 Absent circumstances giving rise to one of
these enumerated exceptions, a valid authorization form must be obtained
in order to preclude liability for the improper disclosure of mental health
records.8 Consistent with the Confidentiality Act's purpose of ensuring
broad legal protection for the principle of confidentiality, 9 the legislature
made it clear that there is more to ensuring the validity of an authorization
form than merely obtaining a signature.' ° "Blanket consent to the
disclosure of unspecified information shall not be valid.""
This comment argues that Illinois' Confidentiality Act inadequately
defines "blanket consent" so as to ensure that an authorization for the
disclosure of mental health records is obtained on an informed and
consensual basis. This is especially so where a recipient's authorization
results in the unintended release of information not thought to be contained
in the records. The purpose of this Comment is to suggest that the Illinois
legislature should look to the doctrine of informed consent in implementing
an operational definition of "blanket consent" in order to make certain that
the confidentiality and autonomy rights of recipients include the right to
make well-informed decisions in authorizing the disclosure of their mental
health records.
Part I of this comment introduces basic legal principles underlying the
requirement of obtaining recipient authorization prior to the release of

7. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3(a) (2000) (imposing a legal obligation upon
therapists to protect confidential information from unauthorized disclosure); 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 110/6 to 12.2 (2000) (defining the circumstances where disclosure is permitted
without recipient authorization).
8. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2000) (providing for the consensual disclosure of
records by a recipient authorization); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2000) (providing that a
violation of the Confidentiality Act may give rise to a civil action for damages); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 110/16 (2000) (providing that one who knowingly and willfully violates the
Confidentiality Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor); see also Peter H.W. van der Goes,
Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: Why and How to Improve the HHS-ProposedLegislation
Governing Law Enforcement Access to Medical Records, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1009, 1045
(1999) (outlining the following common law causes of action that may be available where
confidential health information has inappropriately been disclosed: breach of fiduciary
relationship, negligence, breach of implied term of contract, defamation, and invasion of
privacy).
9.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3(a) (2000); see, e.g., Norskog v. Pfiel, 755
N.E.2d 1, 18 (Ill.
2001) ("It has been universally recognized that significant public and
private interests are served by preserving the confidentiality of mental health records and
communications. To that end, our legislature has enacted laws which place strict controls
on the disclosure of mental health records and communications.").
10.
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2000).
11.
Id. § 110/5(c).
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These principles provide a foundation for
mental health records. 12
examining why the present language of the Confidentiality Act

protects the confidentiality
insufficiently
3

and autonomy

rights of

recipients.
Part II reviews the authorization form requirements of the
Confidentiality Act and examines the meaning of the "blanket consent"
language found therein. 14 In doing so, the "blanket consent" language is
analyzed in light of the Illinois Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the
authorization form requirements mandated by the federal Confidentiality of
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records regulations 15 in M.A.K. v. RushPresbyterian-St.Luke's Medical Center.16 Relevant to the purpose of this
Comment concerns the following two propositions that the MA.K. ruling
supports: that an authorization form bearing a broad description of the
information being disclosed is permissible and that a valid authorization
need only a recipient's consent, not informed consent.1 7 Part II concludes
that a similar interpretation of the Confidentiality Act would eviscerate the
apparent objective underlying the "blanket consent" language, that being to
prevent unfair surprise, and undermine the confidentiality and autonomy
rights of recipients."
Part III argues that the Illinois legislature should look to the doctrine
of informed consent in implementing an operational definition of "blanket
consent" so as to ensure that an authorization for the disclosure of mental
health records is obtained on an informed and consensual basis. In

See infra Part I (discussing the importance of confidentiality in the context of
12.
mental healthcare and providing an overview of the proper and improper forms of disclosure
of mental health records with a special emphasis on the concept of recipient authorization).
See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining that the concept of recipient authorization stems
13.
from the confidentiality and autonomy rights of recipients).
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2000); see infra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing the
14.
mandatory format and content requirements for authorization forms and addressing the
problems raised by the "blanket consent" language).
42 C.F.R. § 2.3 1(a)(1) (2000).
15.
764 N.E.2d 1 (I11.2001); see infra Part II.B-C (arguing that in the aftermath of
16.
the M.A.K. ruling, the "blanket consent" language will not likely preclude a reviewing court
from sanctioning the release of confidential information based upon uninformed consent
obtained through the use of broad authorization forms).
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 18-19 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
17.
majority's decision to uphold the validity of an "impermissibly broad" authorization form
obtained without the plaintiffs informed consent); see also infra Part II.B-C (contrasting the
opinions of the majority and Justices Freeman and Kilbride and further arguing that the
traditional understanding that consent implies informed choice supports the position adopted
by Justices Freeman and Kilbride).
See infra Part II.C (discussing the implications of the M.A.K. ruling upon the
18.
"blanket consent" language of the Confidentiality Act).
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developing this proposition, an overview of the doctrine of informed
consent is initially provided.1 9 Next, Part III defines the doctrine's
applicability in the context of obtaining recipient authorization for the
disclosure of mental health records.20 Lastly, Part III places an informed
consent requirement into the practical context of the mental healthcare
industry and establishes that such a requirement would benefit both

recipients and therapists in the long run.2
I.

BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE REQUIREMENT OF
AUTHORIZATION

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY

"As asepsis is to surgery, so is confidentiality to psychiatry., 22
Confidentiality refers to the principle of protecting against the disclosure of
information given by an individual in the course of a professional
relationship.23

19.
See infra Part III.A-B (providing an overview of the doctrine of informed
consent in the context of obtaining consent for medical procedures and discussing the
doctrine's present role in the mental healthcare industry relevant to the confidentiality
concerns of this Comment).
20.
See infra Part III.C. 1 (proposing an operational definition of "blanket consent"
under the Confidentiality Act).
21.
See infra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the administrative burdens and costs that
would be imposed upon therapists by an informed consent requirement would be minor in
comparison to the benefits it will have upon the therapeutic process in the long run).
22.
Barbara A. Weiner, Provider-PatientRelations: Confidentialityand Liability,

in THE MENTALLY

DISABLED AND THE LAW

559, 559 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed.

1985) (quoting Citizens Privacy Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the [Senate] Committee on the Judiciary [on S.3162 and S. 3164], 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 223, 255 (1978) (testimony of Jerome S. Beigler, M.D., Chairman of the
American Psychiatric Association, Committee on Confidentiality, Aug. 22, 1978) ("Just as a
surgeon cannot operate unless he has optimum aseptic conditions without a potential for
infection, similarly a psychiatrist cannot work unless he has the absolute confidentiality of
the patient, because some of the things that a patient says are very personal and could not be
disclosed unless he were assured of the confidentiality.")).
23.
See EMANUEL HAYT, MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF HOSPITAL RECORDS 79 (2d ed.
1977).
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The parameters of this principle in the context of a therapist-recipient
relationship have long been defined by relevant professional codes of ethics
governing each mental health profession. 24 Each of these ethical codes has
memorialized the tenet that it is a therapist's primary obligation to protect
and respect the confidentiality of the information entrusted to her by a
recipient. 25 For example, the American Psychiatric Association explained:
Psychiatric records, including even the identification of a
person as a patient, must be protected with extreme care..
• . Because of the sensitive and private nature of the
information with which the psychiatrist deals, he must be
circumspect in the information that he chooses to disclose
to others about a patient. The welfare of the patient must
be a continuing consideration.26
Of primary significance concerns the highly private and personal
information shared by the recipient during treatment.2 7
As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v.
Redmond,28 confidentiality in the context of a therapist-recipient

24.

See LELAND C. SWENSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW FOR THE HELPING
59 (2d ed. 1997). See generally HAYT, supra note 23, at 79 ("Whatever, in
connection with my professional practice or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the
life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all
such should be kept secret.") (quoting the Hippocratic Oath).
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
25.
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 4 (2001), available at
(last visited Jan. 5,
http://www.psych.org/apa_'members/medicalethics2001_42001.cfm
2002) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N]; AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT Standard 5 (1992), available at
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code.html (last visited Jan. 4, .2002) [hereinafter AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N]; NATIONAL ASS'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, CODE OF ETHICS Standard
1.07 (Rev. 1999) available at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/Code/code.htm (last
visited Jan. 4, 2002) [hereinafter NATL AssN OF SOC. WORKERS]; CLINICAL SOCIAL WORK
available at
III (Rev. 1997),
Principle
ETHICS
OF
CODE
FEDERATION,
http://www.cswf.org/confidentiality.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2002) [hereinafter CLINICAL
PROFESSIONS

Soc. WORK FED'N].

Weiner, supra note 22, at 570 (quoting American Psychiatric Ass'n, Official
26.
Actions: The Principles of Medical Ethics with Annotations Especially Applicable to
Psychiatry, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1063 (1973)).
See Laurent v. Brelji, 392 N.E.2d 929, 931 (I11.App. Ct. 1979) ("Presumably,
27.
the patient in psychotherapeutic treatment reveals the most private and secret aspects of his
mind and soul.").
518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (ruling that the federal law recognizes a testimonial
28.
privilege against the compelled disclosure of communications between patients and
psychotherapists).
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relationship is rooted in the interrelated principles of private and public
policy interests.29
In addressing the private interests advanced by
confidentiality, the Jaffee Court recognized that confidentiality is essential
not only to the treatment process itself, but also to the recipient's right of
privacy:
Effective psychotherapy . . . depends upon an atmosphere
of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to
make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions,
memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the
problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists,
disclosure of confidential communications made during
counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace.
For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may
impede development of the confidential relationship
necessary for successful treatment.3"
According to survey data released by the California Health Care
Foundation in January 1999, public distrust of the healthcare industry
respecting confidentiality is pervasive. 31 Buttressing the observations of
the Jaffee Court, 32 the Foundation's survey identified that this distrust has
manifested in "privacy-protective" behavior, or the intentional withholding
of information necessary for treatment so as to preclude the possibility of
an embarrassing public disclosure.33
Private interests aside, the Jaffee Court additionally acknowledged
that the principle of confidentiality similarly serves public interests by
providing-an inducement for persons who need treatment to seek it: "[t]he
psychotherapist privilege serves the public interest by facilitating the
provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a
mental or emotional problem. The mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health is a public good of transcendent importance. 34
Nevertheless, absent sufficient confidentiality protections, individuals in

29.
See, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-12.
30. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
31.
See Press Release, California Health Care Foundation, Americans Worry About
the Privacy of Their Computerized Medical Records, (Jan. 28, 1999), available at
http://www.chcf.org/press/view.cfm?itemlD=362 (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Americans Worry].
32.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 ("[T]he mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.").
33.
See Americans Worry, supra note 31.
34.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11.
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need of treatment may 35decide that the risk of public disclosure outweighs
the benefit of treatment.
B. DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Although professionals are expected to protect and respect the
confidentiality of the information entrusted to them by recipients, ethical
codes do not carry "the weight of law."36 Accordingly, in recognition of
the importance of confidentiality, a myriad of state37 and federal 38 statutes
and regulations have been enacted that impose a legal obligation upon
therapists to protect confidential information from unauthorized disclosure.
39
Despite such recognition, the principle of confidentiality is not absolute.
Rather, this principle is subject to a web of exceptions and is further diluted
by the increasingly high risk of improper disclosure.n

Weiner, supra note 22, at 560.
35.
Id. at 570.
36.
See generallyJoy Pritts et al., Health Privacy Project, Institute for Health Care
37.
Research and Policy, Georgetown University, The State of Health Privacy: An Uneven
Terrain: A Comprehensive Survey of State Health Privacy Statutes (1999), available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr-doc/35309.pdf (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Health Privacy]. For an overview of some of Illinois' confidentiality laws, see 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT 301/30-5(bb) (2000) (providing for confidentiality protection in the context of
substance abuse treatment); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15/5 (2000) (governing confidentiality for
clinical psychologists); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/16 (2000) (governing confidentiality for a
social worker); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/70 (2000) (governing confidentiality for a marriage
and family therapist); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 107/75 (2000) (governing confidentiality for a
licensed professional counselor); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (2000) (governing
confidentiality for clergy); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/3(a) (2000) (governing confidentiality
for therapist-recipient relationships).
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994) (establishing privilege for
38.
confidential information communicated in course of federal substance abuse programs); 42
U.S.C. § 300b-3 (1994) (conditioning receipt of federal research grant on assurance that
confidentiality of tests, records, diagnosis, and counseling of patient is maintained unless
patient consents to disclosure or patient identity is redacted); Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (1994) (providing that "[a] covered entity shall not require
a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such
employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability,
unless such examinations or inquiry shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity."); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164, as corrected by
Technical Corrections to Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82944 (Dec. 29, 2000)), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Standards for Privacy].
Weiner, supra note 22, at 565 (noting that the exceptions to confidentiality laws
39.
practically swallow up the rule of confidentiality).
See infra Part I.B. 1, 3.
40.
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1. ProperForms of Disclosure
Confidentiality laws vary in terms of the restrictions and prohibitions
imposed upon the disclosure of records. 4 1 Typically these laws establish a
general rule of non-disclosure 42 and the exceptions carved out of this rule
exist principally where it is thought that society's interests are best served
by the disclosure.43 These exceptions are often defined statutorily and
generally arise in circumstances where: a recipient is in danger of harming
herself or others; the disclosure is being made to government officials; the
information was obtained pursuant to a court-ordered examination, or
under a court-ordered release; or the communications were made with
respect to child abuse."4 Absent any one of these circumstances, written
authorization must be obtained from the recipient or someone empowered
to act on the recipient's behalf prior to any disclosure.45
2. Authorization
The requirement of recipient authorization is the most common
restriction found in confidentiality laws.46

41.
See Health Privacy, supra note 37 (Executive Summary) (discussing state
health privacy laws regarding restrictions on disclosure).
42.
Id.
43.
See CHARLES C. SHARPE, MEDICAL RECORDS REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 57 (1999);
Weiner, supra note 22, at 565. See generally Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (finding that the duty of confidentiality does not involve the protection
of the patient's confidences at the peril of public or individual safety); D.C. v. S.A., 687
N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1997) (finding that the fundamental fairness exception to the therapist
recipient privilege is warranted where the interests of substantial justice and fundamental
fairness outweigh a plaintiff's right to assert the confidentiality privilege); People v. Herbert,
438 N.E.2d 1255 (Il1. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that the physician-patient privilege did not
protect the defendant from disclosure where it was determined that society's interests were
best served by a broad grand jury investigation).
44.
See, e.g., 4 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §
20.12(2)-(3) (Michael G. MacDonald et al. eds., 2001).
46.

45.

740

46.

See Health Privacy, supra note 37 (Executive Summary) (discussing state

ILL. COMP. STAT.

110/5(a) (2000); see, e.g.,

health privacy laws regarding restrictions on disclosure).

SHARPE,

supra note 43, at 45-
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The concept of authorization is rooted in the principle of personal
autonomy for "autonomy encompasses the right to control the
Accordingly, the
dissemination of personal health information. '" 7
requirement memorializes the notion that the right to renounce
confidentiality rests primarily with the recipient.4 8
"Authorization" is used interchangeably with the terms "release" and
"consent. ' 49 To say that a recipient has authorized his therapist to release
records to a third party means that he has empowered the therapist with the

legal. authority to do so.50 A valid authorization, therefore, waives the

recipient's right to the exclusive ownership of that confidential information
and the therapist is then entitled to disclose that information without risk of
liability. 51 The validity of the authorization often depends upon whether
the governing confidentiality law specifies mandatory format and content
requirements for the authorization form. 52 Thus, recipients are left with
two potential causes of action against a therapist: one for disclosing
confidential information absent any authorization and another for failing to
obtain a valid authorization."
3. Improper Forms of Disclosure
Aside from the aforementioned exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure, the principle of confidentiality is further diminished by the
increasingly high risk of improper disclosure.54 According to a 1994 report

Can Congress Protect
MITCHELL L. REV.
223, 231 (1999); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600, 605 (1977) (finding that
individuals have a privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters in the
content of medical records); van der Goes, supra note 8, at 1049 (citing Lawrence 0.
Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 513-14 (1995)).
E.g., HAYT, supra note 23, at 100.
48.
E.g., SHARPE, supra note 43, at 45-46 (citing KRISTYN S. APPLEBY & JOANNE
49.
47.

Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy:

Confidential Medical Information in the "Information Age "?, 25 WM.

TARVER, MEDICAL RECORDS REVIEW

156 (2d ed. 1994)).

50. Id.
See People v. Herbert, 438 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 (I11.App. Ct. 1982) (holding that
51.
the forms entitled "Authorization for Release of Medical Information" constituted valid
waivers of the physician-patient privilege).
See SHARPE, supra note 43, at 46.
52.
E.g., Capocy v. Kirtadze, 183 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a form
53.
that does not contain all of this information does not constitute a valid authorization even if
referred to by the parties as such).
DATA

54.

See Carter, supra note 47, at 233-34 (citing

IN THE INFORMATION AGE:

USE, DISCLOSURE,

Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1994)).

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH
AND PRIVACY 157-60 (Molla S.
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by the Institute of Medicine, there are three common types of disclosure
that pose a threat to confidentiality.55
These forms include:
the
"inadvertent disclosure," or the unintentional release of confidential
information resulting from one's careless conduct;56 the release of
information without authorization; 57 and, most relevant to purposes of this
Comment, the "routine" release of information based on the blanket
consent of the patient. 58
What renders a blanket consent improper is the risk of an unintended
release of information not known to be in the records.5 9 "A signed form
may constitute evidence that a patient consented ... but [it] does not prove
that the consent was truly informed., 60 This risk exists in tension with the
recipient's right of autonomous decision-making since a recipient's
ignorance impedes his ability to understand the repercussions of his
consent.61 Consequently, the Institute of Medicine regards the "routine"
release of information by way of blanket consent as a problem in need of
redress.62
Although healthcare records have never remained completely
confidential, the increasing use of interconnected electronic information
63
systems has given a new meaning to the concept of improper disclosure:
The electronic information revolution is transforming the
recording of health information so that the disclosure of
information may require only a push of a button. In a
matter of seconds, a person's most profoundly private
information can be shared with hundreds, thousands, even
millions of individuals and organizations at a time.64

55.
Id.
56.
Id. (noting that these types of disclosures can best be dealt with by way of
internal policies and procedures within the institution).
57.
Id. (observing that this type is the most difficult to control).
58.
Id.
59.
Cf KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960) ("Instead
of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns
the specific, there is no assent at all.").
60.
BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 361
(1997).
61.
See HAYT, supra note 23, at 286.
62.
See Carter, supra note 47, at 233-34.
63.
See generally Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82465-66 (discussing the
effect the increasing use of interconnected electronic systems has upon privacy).
64.
Id. at 82465.
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This ease of information sharing, collection, organization, and
retention has diluted the financial and logistical obstacles that have
traditionally served to protect the confidentiality rights of recipients.65
Principally, the shift from paper to electronic records has added a new
dimension to the notion of "blanket consent," for a recipient's consent to
disclosure can, now more than ever, result in the release of more
information than the recipient had intended.66
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INVALID "BLANKET CONSENT" WITHIN THE

PURVIEW OF ILLINOIS' MENTAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES CONFIDENTIALITY ACT?

A. THE CONFIDENTIALITY ACT

1. Authorization Form Requirements
Illinois requires authorization forms for the disclosure of mental health
records to conform to a certain format as set forth under section 5 of the
Confidentiality Act.67 This format mandates that authorization forms
specify the following points of information: to whom disclosure is to be
made; the purpose for which the disclosure is to be made; the nature of the
information to be disclosed; the right to inspect and copy the information to
be disclosed; the consequences of a refusal to consent; the expiration date
of the consent; and, the right to revoke the consent at any time.68 However,
in addition to these format requirements, section 5 further provides that the
"[b]lanket consent to the disclosure of unspecified information shall not be
valid.",69 Neither an operational definition of "blanket consent" is provided
under the Confidentiality Act nor have Illinois courts squarely addressed

65.
Id.
See id. at 82473 ("[W]e expressed concern about the coercive nature of
66.
consents currently obtained by providers and plans relating to the use and disclosure of
health information. We also expressed concern about the lack of information available to
the patient during the process, and the fact that patients often were not even presented with a
copy of the consent that they have signed.").
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5(a)-(c) (2000).
67.
Id. § 110/5(b).
68.
Id. § 110/5(c).
69.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22-3

how they would view the inclusion of such language.7 ° Although the
"blanket consent" language seems to reinforce the requirement that "the
nature of the information to be disclosed" is to be expressed on the
authorization form, the degree of specificity required remains unclear.
2. "Blanket Consent"
Conventionally, the phrase "blanket consent" in the present context
refers to either: an authorization form that attempts to satisfy all of the
legal format requirements by a nonspecific recitation of those requirements
absent further elaboration; or, a form that purports to grant virtually
unlimited authority to the therapist to release a recipient's records at the
therapist's discretion. 71 The underlying evil in both of these instances

concerns the risk of unfair surprise, or the unintended release of

information not thought to be within the disclosure. 72 However, the plain
and ordinary meaning of the phrase "blanket consent" is vague. The term
"blanket" means "covering a group of conditions or requirements" and
"including many or all items." 73 "Consent" is defined as "permission,
approval, or assent" and "implies compliance with something proposed or

70.
There is little case law addressing the validity of authorization forms under the
Confidentiality Act. Presumably, this is because recipients are unaware that they have any
control over their privacy let alone of their rights under the Confidentiality Act. See
generally Harris Equifax, Health Information Privacy Study (1993), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/polls.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002) (noting that over
eighty percent of persons surveyed in 1999 agreed with the statement that they had "lost all
control over their personal information"). But see generally Mclnerney v. Fagan, No. 96 C
6633 1997 WL 94725 (N.D. I11.Mar. 3, 1997) (finding that whether the authorization was
valid for purposes of the Confidentiality Act was a question of law and fact and that it
would be inappropriate to grant plaintiffs motion to strike this affirmative defense at that
time); Parkson v. Cent. Du Page Hosp., 435 N.E.2d 140 (I11.App. Ct. 1982) (noting that the
court did not believe that execution of limited waiver evidences intent by patients to allow
release of their medical information to unknown individuals or agencies or to public at
large); Capocy v. Kirtadze, 183 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that a form that does not
contain all of the statutorily prescribed information does not constitute a valid authorization
even if referred to by the parties as such).
71.
See, e.g., 3 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §
17.07(1)(b)(i) (Michael G. MacDonald et al. eds., 2001).
72.
Cf E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 1998)
(explaining that the problem with standard form contracts concerns the risk of inequality
between "a person who is meticulous or who chances to have knowledge and a person who
is blissfully unknowing"); LLEWELLYN, supra note 59 (illustrating the notion of "blanket
assent" in the context of contract formation and arguing that there is no actual assent to
particular form clauses).
73.
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 146 (3d coll. ed. 1988).

2002]

"BLANKET CONSENT"

requested, stressing this as an act of the will. '7 4 The combination of
"blanket" with "consent" illogically implies assent obtained from a
recipient without her knowledge as to the information being disclosed.75
The issue thus becomes whether the "blanket consent" language
provides protection to a recipient who signs an authorization form
expressing the nature of the information being disclosed, as required under
the Confidentiality Act, 76 but who is unaware of the particularinformation
being disclosed. For example, consider two recipients, X and Y, who sign
identical authorization forms for the purpose of custody litigation
describing the information being disclosed as "all files in record generated
during 1997 and 1998 treatment sessions." Add into the hypothetical the
fact that Ys files, to her surprise, contained the therapist's personal notes
suggesting that Y may suffer from schizophrenia. Certainly such a
suggestion is potentially fatal to Ys claim for custody.7 7

74.
Id. at 296.
75.
C.f LLEWELLYN, supra note 59 (explaining the concept of "blanket assent" as
lacking knowledge).
76.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5(b)(3) (2000).
77.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Scott, 394 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)
(upholding the trial court's decision io modify custody on the ground that the mother
exhibited a history of paranoid schizophrenia).
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The initial issue raised by the hypothetical concerns whether the
descriptions are specific enough to overcome the invalid "blanket consent"
language. The second issue raised concerns whether the resolution of the
first issue is altered by the fact that Ys files, to her surprise, contained the
therapist's notes.
More specifically, whether the validity of Ys
authorization depends upon her informed consent as to the particular
information being disclosed. The Illinois Supreme Court's recent review of
the federal Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records
regulations 78 in MA.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St.Luke's Medical Center7 9 is
instructive for purposes of ascertaining how Illinois courts would likely
view the effect of the "blanket consent" language in responding to these
issues in the context of the Confidentiality Act. Of particular importance
for purposes of this Comment concerns the following two propositions that
the M.A.K holding supports: that an authorization form bearing a broad

78.
42 C.F.R. § 2.3 1(a) (2000). Section 2.31(a) mandates that authorization forms
for the disclosure of a patient's alcohol or drug abuse treatment records specify the
following:
(1) The specific name or general designation of the program or person
permitted to make the disclosure.
(2) The name or title of the individual or the name of the organization to which
disclosure is to be made.
(3) The name of the patient.
(4) The purpose of the disclosure.
(5) How much and what kind of information is to be disclosed.
(6) The signature of the patient ....
(7) The date on which the consent is signed.
(8) A statement that the consent is subject to revocation ....
(9) The date, event, or condition upon which the consent will expire if not
revoked before ....
42 C.F.R. § 2.3 1(a) (2000).
79.
764 N.E.2d 1 (Iil. 2001). In MAK., the plaintiff applied for a disability
insurance policy with Royal Insurance. Id. at 3. In October of 1994, in accordance with his
application, the plaintiff executed an authorization for release of his medical records. Id.
The plaintiff was then admitted to the defendant hospital for alcohol dependence treatment
in January of 1995. Id. During his treatment, the plaintiff had contacted his insurance agent
regarding the possibility of filing a claim for benefits under his policy. Id. Although the
plaintiff later decided not to file a claim, in April of 1995, the defendant hospital received
the October 1994 authorization form for the release of plaintiffs medical and non-medical
information. M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 3. The defendant hospital then released plaintiffs
records, which included his records of alcohol-dependence treatment. Id. The plaintiff sued
the defendant hospital for breaching the physician-patient relationship, invading his privacy,
and negligently inflicting emotional distress. Id. In response, the defendant hospital
asserted that the release was permissible pursuant to the valid authorization form. Id. at 4.
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description of the information being disclosed is permissible and that
80 a
valid authorization need only a recipient's consent, not informed consent.
B. M.A.K. V. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER

In M.A.K, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Third
District Appellate Court8 ' and upheld the validity of an authorization form
signed by the plaintiff.82 In arriving at this conclusion, the court addressed
the issue of whether the authorization form signed by the plaintiff
sufficiently specified "how much and what kind of information" was to be
disclosed, 3 as required by the regulation. 4

80.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 18-19 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's decision to uphold the validity of an "impermissibly broad" authorization form
obtained without the plaintiffs informed consent).
81.
See generally M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 736 N.E.2d
129, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that the authorization form signed by the plaintiff was
invalid because the wording of the form was "at best imprecise and far too generic").
82.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10.
83.
Id. at 8.
84.
42 C.F.R. § 2.3 1(a)(5) (2000).
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The plaintiff argued that the description on the authorization form was
too broad.85 In support of this argument, the plaintiff presented a
Department of Health and Human Services publication stating that, in the
context of obtaining authorizations, the information being released "should
be described as exactly and narrowly as possible in light of the purpose of
86
the release. Releases for 'any and all pertinent information' are not valid.,
The relevant provisions of the authorization form signed by the plaintiff
stated that it applied to "any and all such information," referring to all
medical and non-medical information possessed by the entities making the
disclosure. 87

85.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 8. The authorization form signed by the plaintiff
was entitled "AUTHORIZATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT" and provided, in
relevant part, as follows:
I AUTHORIZE any physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic,
health care facility, [or] other medical or medically related facility [ ]
*** having information available as to diagnosis, treatment and
prognosis with respect to any physical or mental condition and/or
treatment of me ***and any other non medical information of me *
to give to Royal *** any and all such information.
I UNDERSTAND the purpose of this authorization is to allow Royal
***to determine eligibility for life or health insurance or a claim for
benefits under a life or health policy. ***
I UNDERSTAND THAT my *** medical records may be protected by
certain Federal Regulations, especially as they apply to any drug or
alcohol abuse data.
I understand that I *** may revoke this
authorization at any time as it pertains to any such drug or alcohol abuse
data by written notification *
* I AGREE this Authorization shall be valid for two and one half
years from [October 12, 1994].
M.A.K, 764 N.E.2d at 3-4.
86. Id. at 8-9 (citing "Checklist for Monitoring Alcohol and Other Drug
Confidentiality Compliance," Department of Health and Human Services'Publication No. 18
(SMA) 96-3083 (1996)).
87.
Id. at 3-4.
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Despite such a broad description, the court upheld the validity of the
authorization form because neither the regulation nor the Department of
Health and Human Services formally expressed that a broad description of
the information to be released was impermissible.88
Additionally, the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs
authorization as to subsequently generated records was invalid. 89 The
plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, an authorization for the disclosure
of records not yet in existence was invalid because he did not know at the
time he signed the authorization form that he would later be hospitalized
for alcohol abuse treatment. 9° Thus, his consent was uninformed. 9'
Nevertheless, the court upheld the validity of the authorization reasoning
that the plaintiff had the right not to sign the authorization form and
maintained the right to revoke the authorization.92

88.
Id. at 9.
Another issue addressing specificity concerned whether the
authorization form signed by the plaintiff sufficiently expressed the "specific name or
general designation" of the person or program authorized to make a disclosure, as required
by the federal regulations. M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 6. The authorization form did not include
the specific name of the disclosing program or individual but rather designated the
individuals and programs entitled to make disclosures as "any physician, medical
practitioner, hospital, clinic, health care facility [or] other medical or medically related
facility .... " Id. Consequently, the court had to determine whether the authorization form
satisfied the "general designation" requirement. Id. The issue was one of first impression.
Id. In defining "general designation," the court applied basic principles of statutory
construction. M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 5-6. After concluding that the plain and ordinary
meaning of "general designation" was facially vague, the court looked to the purpose of the
regulations. Id. at 6-7. Although the purpose of the regulations was to ensure the principle
of confidentiality, the court nevertheless concluded that the authorization form was valid
because a 1987 amendment to the regulation broadened the permissible wording of
authorization forms by permitting a "specific name or general designation" rather than
permitting only the specific name. Id. at 7.
89.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10.
90.
Id.
91.
See id.
92.
Id.
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Both Justice Freeman, in his concurring opinion, and Justice Kilbride,
in his dissenting opinion, "strongly" disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the authorization was valid.93 They took the position that
the plaintiffs authorization was invalid because it was overly broad and
thus not a product of his informed consent. 94 As expressed by Justice
Kilbride, a ruling that upholds the validity of an uninformed consent
"defies logic." 95
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE M.A.K. HOLDING UPON THE "BLANKET CONSENT"
LANGUAGE UNDER THE CONFIDENTIALITY ACT

The traditional understanding that consent implies informed choice
supports the position adopted by Justices Freeman and Kilbride.96
"'Consent' is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, where the mind
weighs the good and bad on each side. 97 In accord, consent could hardly
be based upon a recipient's ignorance of the essential nature and
consequences of his authorization.98 Nevertheless, the majority opinion's

93.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10, 17 (Freeman, J.,
concurring) (joining the majority
only because he believes a plaintiff "cannot maintain a private damages action where such
action is grounded upon a violation of the federal regulations"); see MA.K., 764 N.E.2d at
17 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (agreeing with that portion of Justice Freeman's analysis).
94.
Id. at 17-18 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (noting that "it is well established that the
alleged waiver of a right will not be upheld unless the waiver was knowing" and that the
authorization was "impermissibly broad"); see id. at 17 (Freeman, J.,
concurring) (finding
the authorization form to be overly broad).
95.
MAK., 764 N.E.2d at 19 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) ("It would defy logic to
conclude that a patient may validly waive the right of confidentiality in records that do not
even exist at the time, thereby giving informed consent to their disclosure.") (citations
omitted).
96.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 112 (5th ed. 1984);

see HAYT, supra note 23, at 285-86 (defining "consent" as "a free, rational act, which
presupposes knowledge of the thing to which consent is given" and indicating that "consent
supposes knowledge"). Note that the majority's approach is more consistent with that
applied by courts in contracts cases. For example, standard form contracts are routinely
enforced even though the terms therein have not been read. See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 72 (discussing enforcement of standardized agreements).
97.
RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND INFORMED CONSENT: A SEARCH IN
JUDICIAL REGULATION,

LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS,

FRICTION AT THE

INTERFACE 51 (Walter E. Barton & Charlotte J. Sanborn eds., 1978).
98.
HAYT, supra note 23, at 286. See generally Standards for Privacy, supra note
38, at 82474 ("We considered and rejected other approaches to consent, including those that
involved individuals providing a global consent to uses and disclosures when they sign up
for insurance. While such approaches do require the patient to provide consent, it is not
really an informed one or a voluntary one.").
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disregard for this traditional understanding of the notion of consent will
likely have profound implications. As pointed out by the lawyer for the
defendant in M.A.K., the court's holding "has broad significance because
the type of consent form ...at issue [was] one that is frequently used in the
health care industry. Hospitals and doctors have been relying on such
consent forms for years."9
The M.A.K. court's holding has broad significance not only in the
context of the disclosure of medical records, but also in the context of the
disclosure of mental health records. Like hospitals and doctors, therapists
also rely on standard authorization forms in accommodating the countless
requests they receive for the production of mental health records. 1°° In the
aftermath of the MA.K. ruling, they can now feel more secure in doing so
because the ruling sanctions the release of confidential information based
upon uninformed consent obtained through the use of broad authorization

99.
John Flynn Rooney, Court Allows Insurers'Access to Treatment Records, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Dec. 20, 2001, at 1. (quoting Jeffrey I. Cummings, lawyer for the

defendant).
100.
The following language is typical of many authorization forms for the release of
psychiatric records:
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS
[Name of hospital or asylum]
Patient:
Social Security No: __
Birth Date:
Address:
I authorize you to release to the persons listed below information
concerning the medical and psychiatric evaluation and treatment
received by the above named patient at __
[name of hospital or
asylum] during the approximate period from __
[date], to __
[date]. This information is to be used only for the purposes of
[assisting in the pursuit of a legal action and obtaining
psychotherapeuticand medical care].
The authorized information is to be provided only to the following
persons:
[names ofpersons to receive information].
This authorization is valid [for 90 days only]. I understand
that I may revoke this consent at any time by sending a written notice to
the
[Directorof Medical Records or as the case may be] _
[address], _
[city],
County, _ [state].
I understand that I may review the disclosed information by contacting
the _
[Directorof Medical Records or as the case may be] _
- [address],_[city],
County,_
[state].
Dated:
[Signatureof patient or other authorizedperson]
[Ifsigned by other than patient, give relationship]
[Attestation]
9A AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMs 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 136:115 (Rev. 1995).
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forms.' 0 1 Yet, before concluding that a court reviewing the validity of an
authorization form under the Confidentiality Act will inevitably accept this
proposition, one distinguishing factor must first be accounted for.
Although similar in many respects, there are differences in the statutory
language between the federal regulations in M.A.K. and the Illinois
Confidentiality Act. Consider these differences in the02context of the issues
originally raised by the hypothetical illustrated above. 1
The initial issue concerns whether the following .description of the
information being disclosed is specific enough to overcome the invalid
"blanket consent" language of the Confidentiality Act: "all files in record
generated during 1997 and 1998 treatment sessions." Unquestionably, this
description would satisfy the federal regulations analyzed in M.A.K. 103 The
language "any and all such information," as expressed in the M.A.K.
authorization form,'O° is as broad if not broader than "all files in record
generated during 1997 and 1998 treatment sessions."
However, as
distinguished from the federal regulations, Illinois' Confidentiality Act not
only requires authorization forms to indicate "the nature of the information
to be disclosed,"'0 5 but it further declares that the "[b]lanket consent to the
disclosure of unspecified information shall not be valid."' 1 6 Nevertheless,
the language described in the hypothetical would likely be deemed
sufficiently specific because, in accord with the M.A.K. court's reasoning,
the Confidentiality Act does
not expressly indicate the degree of specificity
07
the description must bear.1
Even to the extent that the "blanket consent" language should
significantly alter a reviewing court's approach, because it seemingly
evidences an attempt by the legislature to preclude overly broad
authorizations, courts nevertheless tend to narrowly construe

101.
See generally supra Part I.B-C.
102.
See supra Part II.A.2 ("For example, consider two recipients, Xand Y, who sign
identical authorization forms for the purpose of custody litigation describing the information
being disclosed as 'all files in record generated during 1997 and 1998 treatment sessions.'
Add into the hypothetical the fact that Ys files, to her surprise, contained the therapist's
personal notes suggesting that Ymay suffer from schizophrenia.").
103.
42 C.F.R. § 2.3 1(a)(5) (2000) ( requiring authorization forms to indicate "[h]ow
much and what kind of information is to be disclosed").
104.
M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 764 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ill.
2001).
105.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5(b)(3) (2000).
106.
Id. § 110/5(c).
107.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 9 (reasoning that the broad description was
permissible because neither the regulation nor the Department of Health and Human
Services formally expressed that a "broad description of the information to be released is
impermissible.").
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confidentiality statutes so as to promote the free access of information to
third parties 0 8s Consequently, although the contents of the recipients' files
in the above hypothetical significantly differ, the identical descriptions of
the information being disclosed would likely be permitted.
The second issue regarding the above hypothetical concerns whether it
is significant that Y was unaware of the therapist's personal notes
suggesting that she may suffer from schizophrenia. To the extent that a
reviewing court accepts the proposition supported by the M.A.K. ruling,'0 9
Ys ignorance as to the particular contents of her record will likely be of
little significance. Consistent with the majority's reasoning, Y had the right
to refuse to sign the authorization form. 0 Although a ruling that upholds
the validity of an uninformed consent "defies logic,""'
the majority
11 2
opinion only requires Ys consent, not her informed consent.
In hard cases, courts interpreting the effect of the "blanket consent"
language could strain to avoid an inequitable result by applying one of
several techniques."l 3 Initially, a court could imply that'the legislature
intended to prevent the risk of unfair surprise by including the "blanket
consent" language and, in turn, invalidate an authorization obtained on an
uninformed basis." 4 Or, a court struggling to invalidate an authorization
form could refuse to uphold its validity on the ground that the therapist had
or should have had reason to believe that the recipient would not have
authorized the disclosure had the recipient known that the records being
disclosed contained the particular information." 5 The fiduciary nature of
the therapist-recipient relationship supports this technique because it is a

108.
See 4 MATrHEW BENDER & Co., supra note 44, at § 20.12.
109.
See M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 19 (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's decision to uphold the validity of an "impermissibly broad" authorization form
obtained without the plaintiffs informed consent).
110.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10.
111.
M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 19 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
112.
See id.
113.
Cf FARNSWORTH, supra note 72 (discussing the various techniques courts apply
in refusing to hold a party to a contract in the context of standardized agreements).
114.
See generally In re B.C., 680 N.E.2d 1355 (I11.
1997) (indicating that where the
meaning of a statute is unclear from a reading of its language, courts may look beyond the
language of the statute and consider the purpose of the law, the evils it was intended to
remedy, and the legislative history behind it).
115.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) ("Where the other party
has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement");
FARNSWORTH, supra note 72; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 96, at 119.
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therapist's primary obligation to protect and respect the confidentiality of
the information entrusted to her by the recipient.'16
Nevertheless, the MA.K court opted not to apply either of these
techniques, and it is doubtful that a court reviewing the "blanket consent"
language will either. All too often, signed authorization forms are treated
as prima facie evidence of valid consent whether or not they are obtained
on an informed basis. 1 7 Such treatment of the Confidentiality Act is
problematic because it would eviscerate the Illinois legislature's apparent
intention for including118 the "blanket consent" language, that being to
prevent unfair surprise.

Ultimately, however, whether or not a court interpreting the effect of
the "blanket consent" language accepts the propositions supported by the
MA.K ruling or finds some ground upon which to declare an authorization
form invalid, the effect upon a recipient's right of confidentiality remains
the same. Consistent with the old clich, the cat is already out of the bag.
Hence the need for an explicit informed consent requirement.
III. INFORMED CONSENT AS A SOLUTION

A. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

The principle of informed consent for medical procedures is a firmly
rooted doctrine in American jurisprudence. 1 9 The doctrine stems from the
notion of personal autonomy and rests upon the presumption that a patient
has a right of self-determination where the patient's physical and emotional
well-being is affected. 120 Physicians are required under the doctrine to

116.

See supra Part I.A. and accompanying notes.

117.
See, e.g., M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10 (upholding the validity of an overly broad
authorization form obtained without the patient's informed consent); 4 MATTHEW BENDER &
Co., supra note 44, at § 20.12 (discussing judicial treatment of authorization forms).
118.
Cf.FARNSWORTH, supra note 72 (explaining that the problem with standard
form contracts concerns the risk of inequality between "a person who is meticulous or who
chances to have knowledge and a person who is blissfully unknowing"). But see
LLEWELLYN, supra note 59 (illustrating the notion of "blanket assent" in the context of
contract formation and arguing that there is no actual assent to particular form clauses).
119.
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Miss. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,269 (1990) (noting that
the "notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent
is generally required for medical treatment" and pointing out that "[tjhe informed consent
doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law.").
120.
See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 59-80
(1984) (discussing the birth and development of informed consent).
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fully disclose to each patient all of the facts necessary to enable the patient
to make 1an21 informed decision about whether to undergo a recommended
treatment.
In order to satisfy the doctrine's requirement of complete and full
disclosure, a physician is required to disclose certain points of information
122
that must be conveyed to the patient in a plain and meaningful fashion.
These points of information generally include: a diagnosis of the patient's
condition; the intended result of the proposed treatment; the nature and
purpose of the proposed treatment; the general statistical probability of
obtaining the intended result; the physician's personal clinical experience
and success rate; any risks of complications; side effects or unfavorable
results inherent in the proposed treatment; feasible medical alternatives;
1 23
and, the prognosis if the patient decides not to undergo the treatment.
Courts look to one of two standards in determining whether a
physician's disclosure is sufficient. 124 The reasonable person standard
requires a physician to disclose that information that "a reasonable person,
in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would be likely to attach significance to ... in deciding whether or not to
forego the proposed therapy."' 125 In contrast, the prudent physician
standard requires a physician to disclose that information that "a reasonably
126
prudent physician in the same or similar circumstances would disclose.,

121.
See SHARPE, supra note 43, at 16 (noting that informed consent requires that
"allsignificant and materialfacts be presented to a patient -in languagethat he or she can
fully understand-in order that the individual can make an informed decision either to accept
or refuse a proposed treatment or procedure.") (alteration in original).
122.
See id.
123.
See id.
124.
See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of Physician
Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 557, 563-567 (2000).
125.
Id. at 563-64 (citing Caterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
126.
Id. at 566 (citing Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985)).
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Regardless of the standard applied, the consent of the patient must
include the following key elements: (1) the consent must be specific to the
treatment; (2) the consent must be voluntary; (3) the patient 128
must have the
capacity 127 to consent; and, (4) the consent must be informed.
B. INFORMED CONSENT IN THE MENTAL HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY

Although the doctrine of informed consent is most often referred
to in
the context of consent to medical treatment, the doctrine is similarly
pervasive in the mental healthcare industry. 129 Not only is informed
consent required prior to certain mental healthcare treatments, 130 ethical
codes governing the mental healthcare profession also incorporate an
informed consent-based
approach relevant to the confidentiality concerns
3
of this Comment.1 '
These codes impose a duty upon mental healthcare professionals to
inform recipients 32of the limits of confidentiality prior to their initial
treatment session.
For instance, the American Psychiatric Association requires
psychiatrists to caution recipients of the "connotations of waiving the
privilege."' 33 Likewise, psychologists have a duty to inform recipients of
"the relevant limitations on confidentiality"' 134 and social workers must

127.
Legal capacity refers to one's "ability to fully comprehend all of the
implications and consequences of his or her actions." SHARPE, supra note 43, at 15.
128.
See WINICK, supra note 60, at 347 (outlining the elements of informed consent
as including: disclosure of information, competency, understanding, voluntariness, and
decision making); Erin Nelson, Selected Legal and Ethical Issues Relevant to Pediatric
Genetics, 6 HEALTH L.J. 83, 84 (1998) (outlining the following elements as constituting a
valid consent in the context of consent to treatment: the consent must be voluntary; the
person consenting must have the capacity to do so; the consent must be specific to the
treatment and to the person who is to administer the treatment; and the consent must be
informed).
129.
See generally PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION, MENTAL HEALTH
LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 124-132 (1994) (discussing the development of informed
consent in the context of a recipient's right to refuse treatment).
130.
See id.; ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 102-09 (1996).
131.
See Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 25, at §§ 4.02; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
AsS'N, supra note 25, at Standard 5.0 1; NATL ASSN OF SOCIAL WORKERS, supra note 25, at
Standard 1.07(e).
132.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 25, at §§ 4.02; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSN, supra note 25, at Standard 5.01; NATL Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, supra note 25, at
Standard 1.07(e).
133.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC AS'N, supra note 25, at §§ 4.02.
134.
AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, supra note 25, at Standard 5.01.
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discuss with recipients their right to confidentiality.13 5 Further, clinical
social workers must "discuss fully with clients both the nature of
confidentiality, and potential limits to confidentiality" prior to their first
treatment session.136 Accordingly, the concept of informed consent is not
new to the mental healthcare industry.
Nonetheless, the present understanding of informed consent in the
context of mental healthcare is front-end heavy, in that the therapist's duty
of disclosure primarily exists prior to a recipient's treatment. Although
informed consent has significant importance at that stage, the doctrine is
also fundamental to fair information
practices with respect to the disclosure
1 37
information.
of confidential
C. DEFINING AND JUSTIFYING AN INFORMED CONSENT-BASED APPROACH
UNDER THE CONFIDENTIALITY ACT

Informed consent is a crucial component of confidentiality because it
protects against the unintended release of information that can potentially
subject the recipient to social stigma and discrimination by insurance
companies, healthcare providers and employers. 138 In light of these
significant consequences, recipients ought to have greater control over the
disclosure of their records.' 39 Accordingly, the Illinois legislature should
look to the doctrine of informed consent in implementing an operational
definition of "blanket consent" in order to ensure that recipients are
afforded the opportunity to make well-informed decisions in authorizing
the disclosure of their mental health records.

135.
NATL ASSN OF SOC. WORKERS, supra note 25, at Standard 1.07(e).
136.
CLINICAL SOC. WORK FEDN, supra note 25, at Principle 111(a).
137.
See Carter, supra note 47, at 277-78.
138.
See Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82468 ("A breach of a person's
health privacy can have significant implications well beyond the physical health of that
person, including the loss of a job, alienation of family and friends, the loss of health
insurance, and public humiliation.").
139.
See generally Carter, supra note 47 (noting that "patient autonomy is the basis
for current theoretical justifications for a right of privacy. This 'autonomy encompasses the
right to control the dissemination of personal health information."'); see also van der Goes,
supra note 8, at 1049.
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1. Defining an OperationalDefinition of "Blanket Consent"
An operational definition of "blanket consent" would principally
necessitate that the authorization form be an informed consent.140 More
specifically, the authorization form should describe in plain language the
information being disclosed in a particular and meaningful fashion such
that the recipient is enabled to fully appreciate the risks involved with the
disclosure. 14 ' This requirement would essentially be the equivalent of
imposing a legal obligation upon therapists to reasonably disclose all
information that a recipient would consider material to make an informed
decision regarding whether or not to authorize the disclosure of mental
health records. 142 Consistent with the standards governing the validity of a
patient's informed consent, the validity of a recipient's authorization should
depend upon the following factors:
(1) whether the recipient acted
voluntarily; (2) whether the recipient possessed the legal capacity to
authorize the disclosure; (3) whether the recipient's consent was particular
to the actual disclosure; and, (4) whether143 the recipient's decision to
authorize the disclosure was an informed one.
In context, consider recipient Y presented in the hypothetical
illustrated above who authorized the disclosure of her files for purposes of
custody litigation but who was unaware that the files contained her
therapist's personal notes suggesting that she may suffer from
schizophrenia.44 An informed consent requirement would legally obligate
the therapist to disclose to Yand specify on her authorization form that the
files being disclosed contain notes suggesting that she may suffer from
schizophrenia. Absent this information, Y would not be able to weigh the
consequences of the disclosure and thus give her informed consent.
Accordingly, the therapist's use of authorization forms bearing the same
description, "all files in record generated during 1997 and 1998 treatment

140.
See HAYT, supra note 23, at 286.
141.
Id,"see also SHARPE, supra note 43, at 16.
142.
Cf Gatter, supra note 124, at 563-64 (discussing the reasonable person
standard).
143.
Cf WINICK, supra note 60, at 347 (outlining the elements of informed consent
as including: disclosure of information, competency, understanding, voluntariness, and
decision making); Nelson, supra note 128 (outlining the following elements as constituting
a valid consent in the context of consent to treatment: the consent must be voluntary; the
person consenting must have the capacity to do so; the consent must be specific to the
treatment and to the person who is to administer the treatment; and the consent must be
informed).
144.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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sessions," in obtaining X's and Ys consent was improper because X and Y
are not similarly situated.
In order for Y to prevail in a cause of action against the therapist for
failure to comply with the informed consent requirement, Y would have the
burden of establishing: (1) she was not advised of all of the material
information contained in the disclosed records necessary to make an
informed decision regarding whether or not to disclose; (2) she was not
provided with the same information that another recipient in the same or
similar circumstances would usually have been given; (3) she did not
understand the content of the records being disclosed to the degree that she
was able to make a rational choice; (4) she would not have consented to the
disclosure 45had she had knowledge of the contents of the records, and (5)
damages.1
2. PracticalConsiderations
Necessarily, though, the formulation of an informed consent
requirement must strike a suitable balance between advancing the
autonomy and confidentiality rights of recipients with the practical
considerations of therapists. 146 Nevertheless, with a full view of what an
informed consent requirement would actually entail, these practicality
considerations will likely be outweighed by the benefits that an informed
consent requirement will have upon recipients and therapists in the long
run.
Initially, it must be acknowledged that an informed consent
requirement would impose additional administrative burdens and increased
costs upon therapists. 47 However, a legal requirement of informed consent
would not excessively burden therapists. Rather, such a requirement would
only require therapists to reasonably disclose all information that a
recipient would consider material to make an informed decision respecting

Cf.SHARPE, supra note 43, at 17-18.
146.
See generally Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82474 (noting that the
final privacy standards should be consistent with the objective of reducing the
administrative costs of providing and paying for health care).
147.
See generally Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An
Introduction to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 481, 522 (2000) (noting that the healthcare industry has vociferously complained that
obtaining informed consent prior to each disclosure would be inefficient and unbearably
bureaucratic); Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82474 ("[T]he costs of privacy and
security are properly attributable to the suite of administrative simplification regulations as a
whole ....
").

145.
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whether or not to authorize a disclosure.148 Consequently, therapists would

not be required to obtain
recipient authorization for each particular
49
disclosed.
being
document
Moreover, in cases where a disclosure would almost certainly have no
impact upon a recipient's decision because the therapist is certain that the
recipient is aware of and understands the totality of the information being
disclosed, no disclosure would be required. 150 Further, because it is
essentially the therapist who develops the recipient's record, and thus is
familiar with its contents, therapists would not have to spend hours
reviewing the record in order to determine whether and to what extent
disclosure is necessary. Lastly, and of particular significance, the burden
upon therapists would be minimal because they are already ethically
obligated to enable the recipient to make an informed decision regarding
whether to authorize a disclosure. 5' A legal obligation will only ensure
that this ethical duty is supported by "the weight of law.' 52 In turn, courts

will be obligated to formulate a standard stricter than that applied in M.A.K.

in determining the validity of authorization forms.
Moreover, clarifying the "blanket consent" language by expressly
including an informed consent requirement could alleviate the heightened
sensitivity some therapists experience from not knowing whether or not
their authorization forms comply with the Confidentiality Act.'53 Granted,
existing in tension with an informed consent requirement is the heightened
risk of therapist liability for improper disclosure. 54 However, a clearer

148.
Cf. Gatter, supra note 124, at 563-64 (discussing the reasonable person
standard).
149.
Cf.SHARPE, supra note 43, at 16 (noting that physicians are not obligated under
the doctrine of informed consent to inform patients of "every conceivable risk or side effect
...but the highest risks and the most adverse possible side effects must be disclosed.");
HAYT, supra note 23, at 286 (noting that a patient's knowledge need not be precise).
150.
HAYT, supra note 23, at 286 (noting that informed consent is not required where
a patient "knows in general that his diagnosis and cure may entail many procedures, and that
his very request for a cure would include the willingness to submit to these ordinary
procedures.").
151.
See generally Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82473 ("Many health
care practitioners and their representatives argued that seeking a patient's consent to disclose
confidential information is an ethical requirement that strengthens the physician-patient
relationship.").
152.
See Weiner, supra note 22, at 570.
153.
See generally Kenneth S. Pope & Valerie A. Vetter, Ethical Dilemmas
Encountered by Members of the American Psychological Association, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 397, 399 (1992) (noting that members of the American Psychological
Association reported that confidentiality was the most frequently occurring ethical dilemma
they faced).
154.
See id.
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statement of the law would nevertheless serve as a more stable benchmark
by which therapists could measure their performance in obtaining recipient
authorization.
Administrative burdens and costs aside, an informed consent
requirement would benefit both recipients and therapists in the long run.
Initially, an informed consent requirement would secure the traditional,
albeit recently slighted, 155 understanding that consent implies informed
choice. 5 6 Consequently, this requirement would provide assurance that the
confidentiality and autonomy rights of recipients will be protected.
Moreover, an informed consent requirement would provide an opportunity
to educate recipients and answer any questions they may have about their
confidentiality rights, thus increasing the level of trust between the
recipient and therapist.'57 In sum, an informed consent requirement would
promote effective mental health treatment by increasing the level of
confidence and trust between the therapist and recipient. 158 "Properly
understood, the principle of informed consent is 'the cardinal canon159of
loyalty' joining patient and therapist together in the therapeutic process.",
Although confidentiality is both an ethical and legal concern, it is the
law that dictates the basic rules governing confidentiality in practice. In
order to ensure compliance with the Confidentiality Act, the Illinois
legislature must clarify the "blanket consent" language and implement an
operational definition that includes an informed consent requirement.
While legislative action will not eradicate all uncertainties regarding
authorization requirements for the disclosure of mental health records, a
clearer statement of the "blanket consent" language will make it easier for
therapists to comply with. Even though it may be impossible to strike a
precise balance between the rights of recipients and the practical
considerations of therapists, it must be considered that "[p]rivacy is a
fundamental right. As such, it must be viewed differently than any ordinary
economic good."' 16

155.

156.

See Part II.B-C (discussing the MAK. ruling).

See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 96, at 112.

157.
Cf Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82473 ("Patient advocates argued
that the act of signing focuses the patient's attention on the substance of the transaction and
provides an opportunity for the patient to ask questions about or seek modifications in the
provider's practices."). See generally WINICK, supra note 60, at 362 ("Particularly in the
treatment of those with mental illness, the informed consent process, properly undertaken,
can be an important therapeutic tool.").
See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
158.
159.
WINICK, supra note 60, at 362.
160.
Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82464.
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CONCLUSION

It is the sense of the Congress that each State should
review and revise, if necessary, its laws to ensure that
mental health patients receive the protection and services
they require; and in making such review and revision
should take into account...
[t]he right to confidentiality of
61
such person's records.1
The Illinois legislature should review and revise the Confidentiality
Act to ensure that recipients are afforded their right of confidentiality.

Under the Confidentiality Act, therapists do not have a statutory duty to

obtain the informed consent of recipients prior to the disclosure of their
mental health records. 162 The increasing ease of information sharing,
collection, organization, and retention has added new dimensions to the
notion of "blanket consent" and has further diluted the financial and
logistical obstacles that have traditionally served to protect the
confidentiality rights of recipients. 63 As a result, now more than ever, a
recipient's consent to disclosure can have the effect of releasing
considerably more information than the recipient had intended.' 64 Because
such a disclosure can have significant consequences, 65 recipients should be
afforded the opportunity to make informed decisions respecting the use and
control of their highly private and personal information.

161.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9501, 9501(1)(H) (1994).
162.
Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4615(1) (West Supp. 2002) (providing that
"[a] clinical record is confidential .... Unless waived by express and informed consent...
the confidential status of the clinical record shall not be lost by either authorized or
unauthorized disclosure .... ") (emphasis added), with 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5(a)
(2000) (providing that "records and communications may be disclosed ... only with the
written consent of those persons who are entitled to inspect and copy a recipient's record...
.") (emphasis added).
163.
See Standards for Privacy, supra note 38, at 82465 (discussing the effect the
increasing use of interconnected electronic systems has upon privacy).
164.
See id. at 82473 ("[W]e expressed concern about the coercive nature of
consents currently obtained by providers and plans relating to the use and disclosure of
health information. We also expressed concern about the lack of information available to
the patient during the process, and the fact that patients often were not even presented with a
copy of the consent that they have signed.").
165.
See id. at 82468 ("A breach of a person's health privacy can have significant
implications well beyond the physical health of that person, including the loss of a job,
alienation of family and friends, the loss of health insurance, and public humiliation.").
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Consequently, an operational definition of "blanket consent" should
be implemented under the Confidentiality Act. An operational definition of
"blanket consent" would principally necessitate that the authorization form
be an informed consent.166 While this objective appears to be the intent
underlying the "blanket consent" language, a more explicit informed
67
consent requirement is necessary in the aftermath of the M.A.K. decision.'
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See HAYT, supra note 23, at 286.
166.
See, e.g., M.A.K., 764 N.E.2d at 10 (upholding the validity of an overly broad
167.
authorization form obtained without the patient's informed consent).
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